Protection of indications of geographical origin (GIs) can reduce information asymmetry between producers and consumers, and potentially enhance trade. However, GIs can also possibly divert trade. We rely on panel data about agri-food trade among the 27 countries of the European Union to investigate these issues using variations of estimators proposed by Head and Mayer (2000) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . Our findings suggest that the protection of GIs creates trade when the importing and exporting countries have GI-protected products. There is also empirical evidence regarding a trade-diverting effect when the importing country does not have GIs and a border enlargement effect arising from European GIprotection.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, global consumer concerns about food marketing have grown beyond pricing and safety issues. Nowadays, consumers want to know about production practices (organic versus conventional versus genetically modified), animal welfare, production location (local versus national versus international origins), the food's carbon footprint and whether it has functional properties and is traceable. All of these concerns add new dimensions to the concept of food quality that encompasses more traditional criteria like taste, visual appearance and safety. The relative importance of various quality attributes varies across consumers. Most consumers are willing to trade off some attributes for others quite easily, but some consumers may have lexicographic preferences (e.g., organic is a must).
Even for a controversial attribute like genetic modifications, Noussair, Robin and Ruffieux (2004) showed that a majority of French consumers would be willing to buy genetically modified foods if their price was sufficiently reduced. Thus, new quality dimensions enhance product differentiation, but this differentiation can be perceived as horizontal (just different) or vertical (better). Labelling is a mean to achieve the matching of consumers with a strong valuation for a given quality attribute and suppliers of foods endowed with the quality attribute. Consumers with a strong valuation for specific quality attributes are better off because they get what they want while the suppliers of these attributes can get higher returns than by marketing their products as "generic".
1 In this context, geographical indications (GIs)
can be seen as a mechanism to signal elements of food quality pertaining to the "know how", soil and weather of a given region. 2 However, another aspect of GIs is to prevent producers who have the "know how", but reside outside the designated area, from using the labelled GI.
3 1 A Pareto improvement is unlikely because the reduction in the supply of generic products causes the price for generic products to rise, thus decreasing the surplus of consumers of generic products. Accordingly, aggregate consumer welfare may not improve.
2 The link to a geographical area can be direct as for Champagne and Parma ham or indirect as for Feta cheese and Greece.
GIs have a long history in Europe, and the same can be said about their regulation. 4 The link between production location and quality is perhaps best known for wines, but it has been exploited for many more products, including cheeses, Cognac, Sherry, Teruel and Parma hams, Tuscany olives, Budějovické pivo, and Budapesti téliszalámi.
In Europe, the interest of producers and consumers for geographical indications has increased over time. There were 526 GIs in 2000, 676 in 2005 and 872 in 2010. The
European Commission has been a strong advocate for GIs since 1992 when a regulatory framework was put in place to define the conditions for the registration of GIs as protected.
GIs are also part of the rural development strategy that was at the heart of the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Some interpreted this as a change in policy orientation from "increasing food quantity to increasing food quality" (Becker, 2009: 112) , 5 but a more precise interpretation would focus on product differentiation, as per the European
Commission's description of GIs. 6 .
The protection that accompanies GI designations has implications for international trade, including trade between members of the European Union. Article 30 of the Treaty on
European Union 7 provides for a GI exception to the principle of free trade between member states. GIs are covered by WTO agreements, through Article 22 of the WTO Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). The definition of
GIs used by the WTO is similar to the one used in the European Union's legislation, but WTO members have very different views on GIs (O'Connor, 2004) . The EU sees GIs as a way to 4 GIs were protected through the Paris convention for the protection of industrial property of 1883 (Josling, 2006) . 
5
inform consumers, to foster rural development and to secure cultural and biological diversity.
The EU has an elaborate GI regulatory system that was designed to accommodate the different views about GIs among European countries and avoid intra-EU conflicts resulting from national initiatives (Josling, 2006) . Other countries (such as the United States, Canada, Australia and South Africa) are reluctant to adopt such protection, preferring to rely on their system of trademarks and certification marks (Addor and Grazioli, 2002 The literature on GIs is thoroughly reviewed by Teuber and al (2011) . Most contributions have focused on the overall welfare implications of GIs or on specific welfare components. Some estimated consumers' willingness to pay for GI labelled foods (e.g., Scarpa Philippidis and Spalatro, 2005; van Ittersum and al., 2007) . Other studies compared the welfare implications of different GI certification systems on producers and consumers (e.g. Lence and al., 2007; Bouamra-Mechemache and Chaaban, 2010; Menapace and Moschini, 2012) . Much attention has been given to the measurement of horizontal product differentiation/elasticities of substitution in empirical trade models (Feenstra, 2004) .
However, vertical product differentiation has recently been integrated into trade models to account for observed phenomena like larger firms paying more for their inputs and getting higher prices for their products (e.g. Hallak and Sivadasan, 2013; Crozet and al., 2012, Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Hallak, 2006) . 8 There is also a vast literature on standards and nontariff measures and their effect on prices (e.g. Bradford, 2003; Dean and al., 2009; Kee and al., 2009 ) and on trade flows (e.g. Winchester and al., 2012) . Our analysis of GIs falls in this category.
The objective of this paper is to quantify the effect of GI regulation on bilateral agrifood trade between member states of the European Union. We rely on a generalization of the 6 gravity model developed by Head and Mayer (2002) alike. In this light, the effect of GIs on trade is akin to the effect of sharing a common language/culture. Because non-GI countries tend to be poorer countries in our population, our GI effects may also pick up effects related to non-homothetic preferences and differences in the average level and distribution of wealth across countries. 9 Countries that have GIs tend to export less to countries that do not have GIs. We also found that the protection of GIs has a trade depressing effect by increasing the thickness of the average border between EU countries. This adverse effect, which is equivalent to a "home bias" tax of 1%, matters mainly for poorer countries without GIs.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We specify our conceptual model based on the odds ratio method in section 2. We introduce a set of GI Regulation variables and discuss four different estimators to ascertain the robustness of our results to differences in variable definitions and econometric estimators. We discuss data requirements and sources in 
A GRAVITY MODEL WITH GIs
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We rely on a gravity model estimated on disaggregated data to disentangle the effects of most trade impediments, like distance, trade taxes and non-tariff barriers, while taking into account trade-promoting factors like cultural and political "likeness" variables such as the sharing of a common language. Gravity modelling was long considered a purely ad hoc empirical success whose theoretical foundation rested on some analogy to the law of gravity in physics. It was shown starting in the late 1970s and throughout the 1990s that the gravity model can originate from different theoretical trade models. Many of the recent issues about gravity models have focussed on empirical specification and estimation. For example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) demonstrated that "multilateral resistance terms" are essential in the specification of gravity models. They proposed a complex non-linear estimation procedure to integrate these "price effects". Feenstra (2002) proposed to account for them through the addition of fixed effects for importing and exporting countries. The notorious problem stemming from the large number of zero trade flows has been addressed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) . A solution that has been explored involves using the multiplicative structure of gravity model to eliminate the monadic terms (Head and Mayer, 2013: 21) . The odds ratio method (or odds specification) advocated by Head and Mayer (2000) 10 provides an alternative framework to deal with multilateral resistance terms. 11 This approach exploits the multiplicative functional form of the gravity equation by making either the exporters' (see Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002) or the importers' (Martin and al., 2008 or De Sousa and Disdier, 2006) fixed effects redundant.
The utility of the representative consumer in country i is represented by a constant elasticity of substitution utility function (CES), which is conditioned by the quantities consumed ijh c , where 1,..., j hn  stands for a given variety exported by country 1,..., jN  .
All varieties are differentiated from each other, but products from the same country are weighted equally in the utility function.
(1)
We denote a ij as the preference weight given to exporting country j by consumers in country i. imported products (i.e., equal to  for i ≠ j) such that:
Parameter
Because we focus on intra-EU trade, tariffs are zero and goods can move freely between countries. Because there is one less factor impacting on trade flows, it should be easier to measure the impact of GIs on trade.
Consumer preferences  a ij are decomposed into a deterministic component and a random component (  e ij ) that is normally distributed. The deterministic component involves a home bias parameter (  ) that measures the consumers' relative preference for domestic products, GI policy indicators 14 , and dummy variables that equal one when countries i and j share a common border (CB), a common language (CL) and time binary variables to account for various phenomena such as the changes in the number of countries using a common currency and the last recession. 15 Consumer preferences can be depicted as follows:
The GI policy indicators are meant to capture the trade creation and trade diversion effects stemming from GIs being used by the importing country, the exporting country or both.
16
However, given the large difference in the number of GIs across countries that have GIs, we feel that GI policy indicators should also account for the presence or absence of GIs and the number of GIs. We specify our set of GI policy indicators as follows: c I adj is expected to be positive. If trade creation is to occur, it should be strongest amongst trading partners with GIs. This is more so if GIs generate positive externalities on the demand for non-GI products in countries that have GIs. Consumers living in countries without GIs may not value significantly more GI protected products than unprotected products. If this is the case, exporters of GI products are likely to pursue opportunities elsewhere and sell less in countries without GIs. If on the other hand consumers living in a country without GIs perceive GIs as quality signals, they might express a larger demand for products from countries with GIs. Thus the sign of _.
b I adj is a priori ambiguous. If consumers in countries with GI products perceive products from non-GI countries as inferior, they will buy less from such countries all else equal. However, GI-responsive consumers might value more intensely product differentiation and be more inclined to buy from different sources. Therefore, the coefficient for _. a I adj can be negative or positive. 17 To see this, consider that the marginal rate of substitution between a pair of imported varieties by country i and originating from exporting countries 1 and 2 is given by: 
where i IC is the importer's inclusive value which describes the "full range of potential suppliers to a given importer, taking into account their size, distance and relevant border effects" (Head and Mayer, 2000: 290) .
Equation (4) Head and Mayer (2000) in using the log odds ratio to get rid of it. 20 This results in the following estimable gravity equation:
18 Free On Board (F.O.B) entails that the seller pays for transportation of goods to the port of shipment and, loading cost. The buyer pays the cost of marine freight transportation, insurance, uploading and transportation cost from the arrival port to destination.
19 First, because it depends on parameters that are already in the equation to be estimated; and second, this term putatively contains attributes of all possible origin countries for the product (Head and Mayer, 2000) . 20 Head and Ries (2001) , that Eaton and al. (2011) call the Head-Ries Index (HRI). The problem with this index is that it cannot be calculated without a measure of trade inside a country (Head and Mayer, 2013 
ii measures intranational trade: the total volume of trade occurring within a country. Following Wei (1996) ,
ii is equal to the overall production of the country minus its total exports, which gives the value of goods shipped from a country to its own consumers. Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator is used. Some of our data came from databases that use other classification systems such as International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), Broad Economic Categories (BEC) and the Harmonised System (HS). We merge these data sets using methods given by Muendler (2009) and Zerai (2007) .
We use labour costs (wage and social charges) as a proxy for F.O.B price levels, as in De Sousa and Disdier (2006) , to measure differences in production costs between countries. 22 Several measures have been proposed to calculate the internal distance. Wei (1996) uses one-quarter of the distance to the nearest foreign economic center. Wolf (1997 Wolf ( , 2000 uses the distance between the two largest cities in each country. As Nitsch (2000) , Leamer (1997) and Head and Mayer (2000) , we use the disk methodology which assumes that internal distance is proportional to the square root of the area of the country. Table 1 shows the extent of cross-country differences between countries. Italy and France are leading with 192 and 167 labels respectively, but several countries do not have any. (5) can also be done with a random effects estimator or a fixed effects/within estimator. Both estimators treat the country pair intercept as a random variable, but the fixed effects estimator has the advantage of being consistent when the intercept is correlated with explanatory variables.
24 Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for bilateral import and GI number by country in our sample between 1999 and 2009. 25 It has also been recognized that only a small fraction of domestic firms engage in export activities. Melitz (2003) explains this by introducing fixed export costs and heterogenous productivity across firms. Poisson estimator, as opposed to the log of this ratio. In addition to the PPML estimator, we also report results from a random-effects Poisson estimator to account for the panel structure of our data.
Estimation Results
The estimation results based on adjusted GI policy indicators are reported in Table 3 . This set of indicators is made up of dummy variables interacting with the sum of GIs in the exporting and importing countries to capture the marginal effects of GIs depending on whether only the importing country has GIs or only the exporting country has GIs or both countries in the trading pair have GIs. (Giles, 1982) .
Except for the GI coefficients, the estimation results are less affected by the manner with which GI variables are defined than by the estimation methods. From Table 3 , we can see that the estimated coefficients on relative GDP are relatively close to one, as predicted by the theory (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Vancauteren and Weiserbs, 2011) . This is especially true for the OLS and random effects estimators in columns (1) and (2). Relative distance coefficients are highly significant and have the expected negative sign. However, the PPML distance elasticity is very large, even after considering that our application focusses on agricultural products. 28 As expected, the log of relative prices has a negative effect on trade and this comes out from all four estimators. Our priors about common language and common border are for positive effects even though mixed signs have been found in the literature (e.g. Helpman, Melitz and Rubsinstein, 2008) . The estimated coefficients from all four estimators for common language are significant at the 95% confidence level. The OLS and random effects coefficients for common border are positive and highly significant while their PPML and Poisson-random effects counterparts are negative and significant. The control variables for time, "year2004" and "year2009", are highly significant (at 1% level). The estimated coefficient on "year2004" is positive, but that of "year2009" is negative. The positive effect associated with "year2004" is possibly due to the creation of the Euro currency in 1999 and the elimination of "old" currencies in the years that followed. The negative effect of "year2009" is due to the worldwide recession of 2008/2009. Using the coefficients from the random effects estimator (column 2) in Table 3 , the 2004 and 2009 time elasticities are the volume of trade (e.g., Vicard, 2011; Magee, 2008; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) . One way to deal with this issue is to use exporter-year, importer-year and exporter-importer fixed effects. Because all of our countries either have or do not have GIs in all 3 years in our sample, we cannot have exporter-importer fixed effects and GI indicators. The instrumental variable approach, using the number of wine and spirits GIs (by European country) as instruments, did not produce robust results.
respectively 106% and -119%. They reflect the fast growth of agricultural trade between 1999 and 2004 and the drastic adverse effect of the 2009 recession on international trade.
Given our specification, the exponential of the negative of the constant can be interpreted as the border effect which measures the lack of fluidity in international trade relative to internal trade after controlling for distance, economic size and other factors influencing trade. A significant negative constant term is expected and all of our estimators meet this requirement except for the Poisson estimators (PPML) in Table 3 . The magnitude of the border effect varies a lot across estimators and definitions of GI policy variables. Our estimates from models (1) and (2) are 17.6 and 20.49. To put these numbers in perspective, the Canada-US border effects for agricultural trade estimated by Furtan and van Melle (2004) exceed 100 while the EU border effect for 98 industries in Head and Mayer (2000) is 19.5.
Using the coefficients of the random effects estimator in column (2) of Table 3 , we find that crossing the border is equivalent to multiplying internal distance by a factor [   exp 3.0265 / 1.1079 15.37
Given that the average internal distance inside the EU is 81.15 miles, the "width" of the average border is 15.37x81.15=1246 miles or 2005 km.
Although no tariff barriers hinder trade between European countries, the border effect is particularly high. The thickness of the border has been attributed to the prevalence of nationalism, the heterogeneity of standards and regulations applied in countries and differences in language and culture between European countries (e.g. Allaire and al., 2005; Poncet, 2002) . Similar conclusions about the so-called "fragmentation" of the EU market were reached by the European Commission in the late 1980s. 29 Table 3. About here
Impact of the Indications of Geographical Origin (GIs)
The trade creating and trade diverting effects of GIs on trade can be qualitatively ascertained by glancing at the coefficients for GI variables in Table 3 . Columns (1) and (2) attribute a significant trade-creating effect to GIs when the importing and exporting countries have GIs.
The PPML and random effects Poisson estimators show no significant trade creation effect.
Because they were not able to identify a well-documented intra-EU border effect either, we put less weight on these estimators when interpreting our results. The empirical evidence is not as clear when either the importing country or the exporting country does not have GIs.
The random effects estimator (column 2) identifies a significant GI trade-creating effect when the importer has GI products and the exporter does not. In contrast, the Poisson random effects estimator in column (4) uncovered a trade-diverting effect when the importing country has GIs and the exporting country does not. Results across models are more consistent when the exporting country has GIs and the importing country does not. All of the _.
b I adj coefficients are negative, suggesting trade diversion, but they are not statistically different from zero when a two-tailed test is used. If the alternative hypothesis under the t-test is about a negative effect as opposed to a non-zero effect, then the coefficient for _.
b I adj in column (2) is significant at the 5.4% level. This would mean that exporting countries with GI products export less to non-GI countries as their number of GI products increase. The coefficient measuring the diversion effect is smaller in magnitude than the coefficients measuring trade creation. Overall, the regression results support a net trade-creation effect.
Because the Poisson estimators do not seem to perform as well in terms of the sign and magnitude of estimated coefficients, we rely on the random effects results to pursue the investigation of the quantitative effects of GIs (see column 2 of Table 3 ). The estimated coefficients _.
a I adj and _.
c I adj are respectively 0.0075 and 0.0076. These can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. The first one tells us that an additional GI product increases the ratio of external and internal trade by 0.75% when the importing country has GI products and the exporting country does not have any. This percentage increase in trade is due to the addition of a new GI. This marginal effect is almost identical to that obtained when both countries in the trading pair have GIs (0.76%). These effects are fairly large considering that there are hundreds of agricultural products. They can possibly be attributed to consumers in countries with GIs having a stronger "love for variety" than consumers in countries without GI protection for varieties originating in countries with GI protection. Perhaps GI protection produces external benefits that can be likened to national branding that improve the image of GI and non-GI protected products in countries with GI protection. However, it should also be pointed out that countries that do not have GIs tend to be poorer countries whose consumers might be more incline to buy cheaper non-GI varieties. Our model accounts partially for that by explicitly accounting for differences in relative prices and relative economic size.
However, consumer preferences in our model are assumed homothetic to express aggregate demand simply in terms of aggregate income, thus neutralizing distribution effects on aggregate demand. It could be that our GI variables pick up also wealth effects. 30 The gains for exporting countries with GIs are partially offset by a reduction in trade with importing countries without GIs given that _ 0.45
We can also analyse the effect of the GIs in terms of distance equivalents, as in Engel and Rogers (1996) and Head and Mayer (2000) . Relying again on the random effects estimator results in Table 3 , the trade creation effect of _. 
Is GI Protection a Non-tariff Measure for Countries without GIs?
The WTO negotiations on the protection of GIs (discussed under the TRIPS agreements) are particularly difficult because of substantial differences between the European Union, which defends the expansion of high-level protection (accepted for wines and spirits) to all agricultural products, and the United States and Canada, who fear that GI protection would be a trade-impediment (Rangnekar, 2003; AITIC, 2005) . In this section, we want to estimate the effect of GI protection on the border effect, which embodies non-tariff barriers and a home bias effect. We follow the approach used in De Sousa and Disdier (2006) by first reestimating the random effects model of Table 3 without the GI variables. Comparing the constants in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 confirm that the protection of GI products has a 30 We wish to thank a reviewer for bringing this issue to our attention. We experimented with an ad hoc specification that replaced GDP by per capita GDP and population, but this did not have a strong effect on the coefficients of the GI policy variables. A better way would have been to replace the CES utility function in our framework by a non-homothetic utility function. We also estimated models with ,, The trade depressing effect of GI protection can be converted into a tariff equivalent (ad valorem tariff). This approach requires an estimate for the elasticity of substitution between varieties (). Thus, the tariff equivalent of the border effect is equal to expc/( -1) -1, where c is equal to the absolute value of the estimated constant. The price coefficients in 21   Tables 4-5 are estimated values of . As in Head and Mayer (2000) , they are unrealistically small and like them, we assume that  = 9 to measure border effects in tariff equivalents. Our border effect in tariff equivalent based from column 3 is 44.80% while the one for column 1 is 40.41% (according to Table 4 ). The GI effect on the thickness of the border is equivalent to a 4.39% tariff increase. If we assume 6   , the increase in the thickness of the border amounts to a 8.69% tariff increase while the tariff increase falls to 2.90% when 12   is assumed. In short, the European sui generis Regulation of protection of GI products can be seen as a Nontariff Measure by countries without GIs because it increases the thickness of the border between EU countries. However, this indirect effect is small, considering the effects of other factors contributing to the thickness of the average border between EU countries and the trade creation effect of GI protection on trade flows involving pairs of countries that have GIs.
CONCLUSION
This study analyses the impact of GI protected under the European Regulation on relative trade flows. Using the "border effects" model developed by Head and Mayer (2000) and focusing on EU countries, we confirm that the domestic bias may be greatly increased by the effect of the indications of geographical origin (GI). Our findings suggest that the protection of indications of geographical origin (PGI and/or PDO products) significantly affects trade between EU countries. It has been alleged that GI protection reduces information asymmetry between producers and consumers about product "quality" and hence creates trade. We found evidence of trade creation when importing and exporting countries have GIs. This was expected because producers of GI products will seek markets where the specificity of their products is most likely to be appreciated by consumers. We also found a trade creation effect when the importing country has GIs and the exporting country does not, possibly reflecting a greater love for variety by consumers in countries with GIs. However, we found evidence of trade diversion when exporting countries have GIs and importing countries do not. It is hypothesized that it is harder to secure a price premium for exporters under these conditions and as a result there is substitution between export destinations favouring importing countries with GIs at the expense of importing countries without GIs. We also found that GIs have an adverse indirect effect on trade through the so-called border effect. GIs increase the thickness 22 of the border between EU countries. This home-bias is not surprising because a country's GI products are possibly most appreciated at home, when they evoke culture and tradition most vividly. Fortunately, non-tariff measure-like effect is small.
Finally, one should be careful about trying to generalize our results in the context of bilateral negotiations between the EU and third countries, like Canada and the United States.
Because we focused only intra-EU trade, our importers did not have to contend with exporters from non-designated areas that use GI labels because they own a trademark or consider the GI label generic. The joint recognition of GIs and trademarks by non-EU countries should have a positive effect on EU exports because their GI products will be marketed under the GI label, but in some cases it might prove challenging to take market share away from the competing trademarked product. In such instances, the level of trade creation will not be substantial. Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, pooled data by pair (importer-exporter) ***significance at the 1% level, **significance at the 5% level, and *significance at the 10% level Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, pooled data by pair (importer-exporter) ***significance at the 1% level, **significance at the 5% level, and *significance at the 10% level
